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Harald Trapp / Robert Thum: Massimo De Angelis, as a professor of political economy and 
an expert in commons and commoning, what is your relationship to Karl Marx and his 
theories?  
 
Massimo De Angelis: My very first encounter with Marx was in the 1970s in Italy when, 
walking down the street aged fourteen or fifteen, I saw these huge banners with his portrait. 
Later on, as students, we self-organized study groups of his theories together with workers in 
nearby factories. When I went to university I considered myself a Marxist and when I studied 
political sciences, of course, I saw Marx everywhere. Then I went on to study economics at 
the University of Utah. They had a radical program in which Marx was reduced to a political 
economy rather than a critique of political economy.  
I embrace the broader perspective on Marx called “Autonomist Marxism,” which 
understands the categories of his work as categories of class struggle that take many forms in 
many moments in history, and in different circumstances. Fundamentally, it’s the situation we 
are still living in today. So, my relationship with Marx is that, without Marx, I would not been 
able to write about the commons as I write today.  
 
Is it correct to say that you evolved from a communist into a commonist? 
 
The relation between the two terms is very close. I wouldn’t make much distinction, but it is 
important to articulate the two. For Marx, communism was summarized in a couple of 
sentences in his own opus. One sentence comes very early on in his work The German 
Ideology, which he wrote, in some parts, together with Friedrich Engels. In these writings 
communism is not an ideal. It is not a system of rules to be imposed or a model; instead, it is 
“the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.”1  
Another way to understand communism for Marx is summarized in the idea of the 
association of free producers. What does “association of free producers” mean? It means that 
producers, whoever they are, not just factory workers but university lecturers, students, care 
workers, nurses, or teachers, are free. They are free to associate, to decide the what, the how, 
and the how much of production. 
Finally, another great statement about communism by Marx is that famous sentence in 
the Critique of the Gotha Program, according to which on the flag of the future society there 
would be written: “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs!”2 
If you take all these sentences, which are statements of what communism is for 
him, and if you study the commons that are those social systems—in which people take things 
in their own hands, to meet needs, to give rise to aspirations and do things together—you 
realize that when people come together and emphasize horizontality, they emphasize deep 
democracy, a deep participative democracy in the way they organize themselves, which is 
very close to the principles of Marx. So, for me, the answer to “what is the difference between 
communism and commonism?” is—at this level—not much.  
 Of course we live in a time in which the word communism has been dirtied by 
historical experience; it has been dirtied by the Gulags; it has been dirtied by authoritarian and 
totalitarian regimes that spoke in the name of communism. In the consciousness of many 
people the word is still associated with that negativity. It is a dangerous word. So for me “co-
mm-o-n-ism” is just a way to say that it is different from communism. 
 
Marx speaks about the enclosure of land as the beginning of the process of primitive 
accumulation, which preceded the process of capitalist accumulation. What is the 
relationship between capital and the enclosures? And why is it still relevant today in the 
context of commoning?  
 
That is a huge question. The enclosures bring us back to the origins of modern capitalism. The 
origin of modern capitalism was the expropriation of land from the peasantry of Europe, 
especially in England. English capitalism began with the historical process known as “the 
enclosures,” when the landed gentry took away common land that farmers used for their 
subsistence. They took it away in order to valorize it capitalistically, to raise sheep and make 
money out of it. The enclosures—it is important to remind ourselves—are not interesting 
because they are something that happened in the past, but because enclosure, or what Marx 
refers to as “primitive” or “original accumulation,” is a recurrent aspect of capitalist 
development. It still happens today. 
For the small peasantry in England in the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth 
centuries, common land was a means of subsistence. The commons in those times were 
fundamental elements for people’s reproduction, and this was not only the case in Britain, but 
also all around the world. By taking away that means of subsistence peasants were not left 
with enough to survive and they were forced implicitly to either migrate, rob the gentry or 
rebel. Those were the three options they had in spite of contradictory laws by Henry VI or 
Henry VIII to prevent them from moving, for example. But migration was a mass 
phenomenon. 
 Marx has shown how, historically, primitive accumulation was a precondition of 
capitalist development. This process created on the one hand the modern proletariat, with a 
high dependence on the wage for its reproduction, and on the other the accumulation of 
capital necessary to fuel the industrial revolution. From the 1980s onwards, the profound 
limitations of this interpretation became obvious. Neoliberalism was rampaging around the 
world as an instrument of global capital. Structural adjustment policies, imposed by the IMF 
[International Monetary Fund], were promoting enclosures of commons everywhere: from 
community land and water resources to entitlements, to welfare benefits and education. These 
processes are pretty much the same today all over the world. Today, the massive wave of land 
grabs in Africa by multinational corporations is exactly the same thing.  
This process of enclosures of commons is an ongoing phenomenon. In reverse this 
also means that the production and reproduction of commons are an ongoing process. People 
again and again try to create and access resources in a way that is different from the 
modalities of the market, which is the standard way for capital to access resources. Take for 
example the peer-to-peer production happening in cyberspace. The process of the formations 
of commons is ongoing. The commons are also a social force that recurs in history and, if 
developed to a certain extent, can contrast capital. 
 
Is commoning a more rural than urban phenomenon? You say that the state is more present 
in the metropolis than in rural areas.  
 
The state exists in the condition of the rural village but it is far more distant. You do not feel 
the control of the state so closely. In part, this is because there is still a network of solidarity, 
an informal network of solidarity among neighbors, or, if you are part of a clan, a series of 
relatives, or an extended family.  
The condition of the city is more isolating for us, but commoning also exists in the 
city. We are witnessing an incredible urban movement that reclaims commoning and turns it 
into a social form for change. When I am talking about commoning as a verb, it is a verb that, 
as the historian Peter Linebaugh discovered, was used at the time of the commons in England 
before the enclosure. When the commoners wanted to go onto the land—perhaps to collect 
wood, and doing so together—they went to common. They did not go to work. They went to 
common, which is of course a labor activity because you cut the trees. You may decide 
together, which trees to cut, but it’s still a labor activity, which is organically linked to nature, 
and to the needs of nature, and to the needs of the community. 
That commoning, that doing common in a horizontal way—in a participatory way—
also exists in the cities. There are many examples: in Spain we have an amazing movement, a 
housing movement called PAH (Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca) that reclaims 
houses from the banks in compensation for what the state paid to the banks in order to rescue 
them from the crisis. They reclaim these houses and organize their own reproduction in there. 
The incumbent mayor of Barcelona comes from that movement. As a movement of 
commoning it has generated a political alternative, or at least a sense of political alternative.
  
One example of a completely different way of commoning, but a very effective one, is 
the self-organization of consumers and producers I described in my latest book. Small food 
producers come together in self-organized markets in the city to negotiate, and often fight 
with, local authorities to have the right to create their own organic label and avoid having to 
pay money to the state for an organic label. In fact the division between producers and 
consumers is transcended. It is overcome because consumers and producers participate 
together in market assemblies to define prices and to define quality—to define who is in and 
who is out. This is a completely different model to a supermarket, where the consumers are 
those who come in and pay and the producers are some distant people around the world who 
provide the food that we eat.  
 
So commoning processes involve individuals, subjects. There is something that Foucault calls 
the production of subjectivity. What would the subject of the commons be? 
 
The subject of the commons would be a commoner. A commoner is someone who definitely 
aspires to freedom, which is different to the freedom we aspire to as consumers.  
 
Could you say more about your definition of freedom? 
 
When we act as consumers, as Milton Friedman reminded us back in the early eighties, we are 
free to choose. That is freedom in the neoliberal paradigm. We are free to choose between this 
phone and that phone; or between this apple and that apple; or between different items in a 
large basket of goods. Although freedom of choice is subject to budget constraints, which are 
given to us by our relative position within the market. Our freedom is confined into a market 
choice. What this market chooses to give to us, the menu that is presented to us, is like the one 
at a restaurant. You are free to choose whatever is on the menu. But who choses the menu?  
I think that the commoner’s freedom is not only an individual freedom, but it is a 
collective freedom to decide what is on the menu. Meaning: how do we produce what we 
produce? What do we produce? When do we produce? How much work do we have to put in 
in order to produce? How many resources do we want to use to produce a particular object? 
The freedom of the commoner is a freedom that involves all sorts of decisions, complex 
decisions that are linked to a particular production or reproduction. 
When we do this, it is not only in order to maximize our utility or our profit, but also 
in view of our own resilience and the sustainability of the environment and the ecological 
system. That is the fundamental difference between the two different freedoms; it is important 
to underline that the commonist paradigm is for freedom. Of course, if the word “freedom” is 
left unqualified, it becomes an empty word. We have to qualify it in this way: “we want to be 
free to decide everything at stake in our lives and do it together.” 
 
At the same time you also speak about the need for regulations. There was a famous 
discussion in economic science about the problem of free access … 
 
The problem of free access goes back to Garrett Hardin, who wrote a paper in 1968 called The 
Tragedy of the Commons.3 Hardin presents a parable of a few farmers who share common 
land and on this common land each has their own animals that need to graze. Hardin’s 
argument is that if each farmer maximizes their own utility, they will all bring as many 
animals as possible onto that common land, whether sheep or cows. Why? Because that 
pasture is free for all of them. Each of them has an interest in increasing their stock, to make it 
bigger and grow faster. 
But Elinor Ostrom made the point that this is not a tragedy of the commons. The 
commons have rules that are set by the commoners. That association of individuals will come 
together and decide rules of access. This is what is happening around the world because 
people know that if everybody just follows their own self-interest, the resources will be 
depleted. This results in an interesting problem: what is the relation between free access and 
the commons? The commons are systems in which the access to a resource, in this case land, 
is regulated by the commoners who set specific rules. It happens everywhere, like in Maine in 
the United States, where lobster-fishing communities have learned to do exactly that to 
regulate their own self-interest, otherwise the lobster catch would be depleted. And they 
learned that through history, through experience. The problem is to understand that free 
access, in order to exist, has to be part of a commons. That means also that work is necessary 
for the reproduction of free access. 
 
The production and reproduction of commons are, by definition, self-organizing processes. 
You say that both the state and capital will always have a parasitic relationship with the 
commons. Is there no possible way of integrating capital or the state into the idea of the 
commons?  
 
I wouldn’t want to integrate capital. Absolutely not! Why? Because the logic of capital is 
fundamentally a logic of growth for growth’s sake. I would be extremely alarmed if capital 
was integrated, as it always tries to use the commons.  
Concerning the state, I would be very skeptical, but I have an open mind in this sense 
that the state uses this discursive fiction, which is the fiction of democracy. I am a democrat. I 
want democracy. In my opinion, to the extent that the state is deeply democratized and 
detached from capital—that is: the extent to which the state is transformed into something 
else—the state can become an element of the commons ecology. But this is something that we 
may not call “state” anymore, as I brought up earlier in the Marxian term of the association of 
free producers, it is a higher scale regulation. It depends what we are aiming at. If we are 
aiming at a world of disconnected eco-communities then we don’t want the state. If we want a 
world where there are autonomous communities of different sizes as well as different 
institutions, but we also want regulations that include them all together, then we might need 
something: a new paradigm of the state.  
 
Here in London, capital is very present, even more than the state. What could a London 
defined by commoning and the commons look like? Would there still be private property?  
 
We are speculating here, but let us assume that there are ongoing waves of commons 
movements. Maybe brought on by great crisis or maybe because suddenly people do not want 
the life they are living now anymore. What would happen? Well, one answer would be that in 
complexity-theory you cannot imagine the future. The future will emerge. That would be the 
fair answer to give you.  
 On the other hand, the temptation to build scenarios exists. So scenario one could be: 
the City of London and the elites will use all their money to repress commoning and turn 
everything into a fortress world. It is a scenario that you see in many cities around the world: 
the gated communities. But you could also have the collapse of the institutions. You could 
have capital that would migrate somewhere else, where there is still some stronghold for 
capital. 
Scenario two: the Detroit effect. Detroit was the metropolis of the automobile industry. 
What happened in Detroit? Detroit imploded at the very moment the automobile industry 
disappeared, or was reduced enormously. What happened is that large areas around Detroit 
have been taken over by the communities who were facing a food desert, with no 
supermarkets anymore. The old structure that took care of their basic reproduction in 
exchange for money disappeared, leaving a lot of empty space, which they occupied in a 
communal way. And they occupied it for what? Initially, for producing food. Out of that a 
network of reproduction developed.  
In short, a new paradigm would rise, which in the first place would re-territorialize the 
management of reproduction needs: food, education, care. It would empower communities to 
do that in full autonomy. And then different regions around Europe could collaborate, share 
knowledge, share technologies, share priorities for the future.  
 
Could you describe the mode of operation that uniquely defines the dynamics of commons? 
 
That is the notion of autonomy. Commoning—the doing in common—is the force that 
reproduces the commons. Commoning is to find the rules together. It is a very complex 
activity articulated in many ways. By “doing in common” I mean: doing things together 
without an external agent from the top telling us what to do. We are taking things into our 
own hands. That is autonomy. A practical element of autonomy that doesn’t exist in all the 
commons is autopoiesis. I encountered the notion of autopoiesis in Luhmann’s writings, but 
then I went back to Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, especially to Varela, who 
wrote a very important essay on autopoiesis in the early 1980s. Autopoiesis, according to 
Varela, is when a particular system reproduces not only the relations among its components, 
but the components themselves. The autopoiesis or auto-production implies the production 
and reproduction of the components of that system. That is fundamental.  
 
If commons are autonomous, what is the relation of the commoners to society at large? 
 
The commons are not totally, but principally, isolated from the environment. Although the 
outside often mediates what the commoners do, there is a large sphere of autonomy. The 
commoners set their own rules. After studying thousands of commons, Ostrom distilled 
principles—not because she believed they are right—that are necessary for having commons 
to reproduce and to sustain themselves. According to her, if those principles are met, 
including transparency and horizontal monitoring, the commons will work.  
If we believe Ostrom, there are tools that make commons long-term phenomena. But 
we do not want only small groups of people coming together and doing their thing. What we 
want is to transform society. That is the difference between my work and that of many other 
people writing on commons. I do valorize small commons and all the efforts they make to 
reproduce part of their lives autonomously, but, on the other hand, we want to push for bigger, 
more complex forms and change the world.  
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